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1 This paper considers the views of two figures whose work falls on either side of the
heyday  of  American  pragmatism,  Thomas  Reid  (1710-96)  and  Ludwig  Wittgenstein
(1889-1951). The broad similarities between Reid’s and (the later) Wittgenstein’s views,
and in particular their epistemological views, has been well documented (see n. 22 below).
Here, I argue that such similarities extend to the relation in their work between common
sense and the presence of elements in their thought that can be considered pragmatist in
some interesting and important respect. 
2 Beginning  with  Reid,  I  argue  that  some  specific  theses  commonly  associated  with
pragmatism – e.g.,  that meaning, truth,  or the justifiedness of a belief is a matter of
practical effects or efficacy – clearly run counter to his stated views, and stand in tension
with the well-known common sense character of his work. At the same time, however,
and as others have noted,  other pragmatist  themes and ideas – e.g.,  about the close
relations between belief (and doubt) and action, theory and practice, and facts and values
–  do  have  a  clear  precedent  in  Reid  (§2).  Most  fundamentally,  however,  Reid’s
epistemological  views in particular  display an adherence to  the idea that  practice  is
somehow primary – an idea that’s central to pragmatism ‘broadly conceived’, as Brandom
calls it and, according to some others (e.g., Putnam, Cavell), to pragmatism per se. What’s
more,  once  we  are  clear  on  the  respects  in  which  Reid’s  views  do  incorporate  an
important pragmatist  element,  it  becomes clear that far from being at  odds with,  or
needing supplementation by, the latter, common sense is in fact inseparable from it (§3). 
3 Finally, I turn (§4) to Wittgenstein, and suggest that the same close connection between
pragmatist elements and common sense as we find in Reid is present here as well: like
Reid, Wittgenstein rejects several ‘narrow’ pragmatist theses; but he too ascribes practice
a crucial role. And while he seldom explicitly refers to common sense, the notions of good
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judgment, and of the reasonable person – hallmarks of common sense, as Reid conceives
of it – are at the heart of Wittgenstein’s later epistemological views. 
 
2. Reid (and Peirce) on Belief and Doubt
4 One respect  of  similarity  between Reid’s  views and ideas  closely  associated with the
pragmatist tradition concerns his treatment of belief and, relatedly, of doubt. To set the
stage here, it’s useful to consider the criticism of Reid that he attributes to us – that is, to
normal humans – beliefs that it is in fact doubtful that we all hold.
5 Central  to Reid’s  common sense philosophy is  the idea of  ‘first  principles,’  which he
divides into First Principles of Necessary Truths, and First Principles of Contingent Truths
(1785:  6.5-6.6,  pp. 467-512).  The  former  include  metaphysical  principles  such  as  that
whatever begins to exist must have a cause, through to moral principles such as that an
unjust  action  has  more  demerit  than  an  ungenerous  one.  The  latter  include  such
propositions as that nature is uniform, that the things of which I am conscious, and those
which I distinctly remember or perceive, do exist, that testimony is a fundamental source
of evidence, and that the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are
not  fallacious.  Among  Reid’s  claims  here  are  that  such  principles  are  “universally
believed”  (1785:  1.2,  pp. 44-6;  6.4,  pp. 465-6),  and  indeed  that  they  “are  no  sooner
understood than they are  believed.  The judgment follows  the  apprehension of  them
necessarily,  and both are  equally  the  work of  nature,  and the result  of  our  original
powers” (1785: 6.4, p. 452).
6 But are these principles such that we all  – at  least,  all  of  us who are sane,  and who
understand them – believe them? Some have found that incredible. Thus, for example,
Nicolas  Wolterstorff  has  argued that,  while  (normal)  humans may indeed all  take  for
granted Reid’s first principles, we shouldn’t conflate this point, as Reid does, with the
dubious idea that they are universally believed: 
most people surely don’t actually believe those propositions that all those of us who
are normal adults must take for granted in our living of life in the everyday. Most
people  haven’t  even  so  much  as  entertained  them,  let  alone  believed  them.
(Wolterstorff 2001: 225; cf. 2004: 93)
7 Notice, however, that this objection requires that we think of belief at its most explicit –
as involving conscious consideration of the belief’s object or content. But that beliefs are
generally like that is clearly not Reid’s view. For example, speaking of the seventh first
principle of contingent truths – “That the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth
from error, are not fallacious” (1785: 6.5, p. 480) – Reid says:
We may here take notice of a property of the principle under consideration, that
seems to be common to it with many other first principles […]; and that is, that in
most men it produces its effect without ever being attended to, or made an object of
thought.  No  man  ever  thinks  of  this  principle,  unless  when  he  considers  the
grounds of scepticism; yet it invariably governs his opinions. (1785: 6.5, pp. 481-2) 
8 More generally, belief is not simply a specific type of ‘attitude towards a proposition’ for
Reid.  Belief  must  indeed “have an object,”  Reid says:  “he that  believes  must  believe
something;  and that which he believes,  is  called the object  of  his  belief” (1785:  2.20,
p. 227). When we specify or make explicit the belief’s object – or, as we would say, its
content – we do so by using a complete sentence, in subject-predicate form. As Reid puts
it,  belief  “is  always  expressed  in  language  by  a  proposition,1 wherein  something  is
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affirmed or denied.” (1785: 2.20, p. 228). However, as Angélique Thébert observes, most
often our beliefs are not so expressed (2015: 203); and – as already noted, and as the above
passage makes clear – a belief or its content (or “object”) need not for Reid be something
to which we reflectively attend. So we can agree with Wolterstorff that “[m]ost people
haven’t even so much as entertained” the propositions by which Reid expresses his first
principles. Even so, they may well have the relevant beliefs. Belief is the “the main spring
in the life of a man” (1785: 2.20, p. 228); our beliefs are manifested in our thoughts and
actions.2 And  Reid  frequently  speaks  of our  thought  and  conduct  as  manifesting  an
‘implicit belief’ (e.g., 1764: 1.3, p. 16; 6.20, p. 170; 1788: 3.1.2, p. 87), an ‘instinctive belief’
(1788: 3.1.2, p. 87), an ‘implied conviction’ (1785: 6.5, p. 479), an ‘inward conviction’ (1785:
6.5, p. 482), or an ‘implicit faith’ (1785: 6.5, p. 477), in the first principles:3 
Our ordinary conduct in life is built upon first principles, as well as our speculations
in  philosophy;  and every  motive  to  action supposes  some belief  […].  (1785:  6.4,
p. 464)
Who can doubt […] whether mankind have, in all ages, believed the existence of a
material world, and that those things which they see and handle are real, and not
mere illusions and apparitions? Who can doubt whether mankind have universally
believed that everything that begins to exist,  and every change that happens in
nature, must have a cause? Who can doubt whether mankind have been universally
persuaded that there is a right and a wrong in human conduct? – some – things
which,  in certain circumstances,  they ought to do,  and other things which they
ought not to do? The universality of these opinions, and of many such that might be
named, is sufficiently evident, from the whole tenor of men’s conduct, as far as our
acquaintance reaches, and from the records of history, in all ages and nations, that
are transmitted to us. (1785: 1.2, p. 45)
9 As noted above,  the picture of  belief  that emerges here has obvious affinities to the
pragmatists’, and perhaps most especially to the views of C. S. Peirce, who characterizes
belief as “a rule active in us” (CP 2.643), “a general principle working in man’s nature to
determine how he will act” (CP 2.170), and as “something on which a man is prepared to
act and…therefore, in a general sense, a habit” (CP 2.148).4,  5 The intimate connection
between belief and action, moreover, lies behind Reid’s frequent criticisms of the sceptic
as  somehow insincere –  criticisms that  Peirce would later  echo with his  well-known
distinction  between  real  and  merely  professed  or  “paper”  doubt  (e.g.,  CP  5.514;  see
Lundestad 2008: 177). Thus, the sceptic is,  as Peirce would say, a “breath holder” (CP
5.499); or, as Reid puts it,  scepticism is a “chamber exercise” or “hobby-horse” (1764:
2.6-7, p. 36) that no sane person can actually maintain:
even  those  who  reject  [one  or  another  first  principle]  in  speculation,  find
themselves under a necessity of being governed by it in their practice. (1785: 6.5,
p. 480)
I never heard that any sceptic run his head against a post, or stepped into a kennel,
because he did not believe his eyes. (1785: 1.2, p. 46)
If a man pretends to be a sceptic with regard to the informations of sense, and yet
prudently keeps out of harm’s way as other men do, he must excuse my suspicion,
that he either acts the hypocrite, or imposes upon himself. For, if the scale of his
belief were so evenly poised as to lean no more to one side than to the contrary, it is
impossible that his actions could be directed by any rules of common prudence.
(1764: 6.20, p. 170)
10 Common sense philosophy, with its appeal to features of our everyday practice, has often
met  with  the  charge  of  philosophical  irrelevance,6 and  Reid’s  claims  here  are  no
exception. Thus, for example, Lynd Forguson argues that the point Reid is making in
passages such as the foregoing is “nothing more than an ad hominem: the sceptic does not,
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and cannot,  practice what he preaches,  an observation which Hume freely admitted”
(Forguson 1989: 112).  Likewise, Philip de Bary argues that Reid’s frequent claims that
sceptics “do not practice what they preach” are “shallow” (2002: 7) and not a proper part
of his response to scepticism.7 De Bary writes:
one  of  Reid’s  favourite  objections  to  scepticism  –  that  sceptical  conduct  is
deplorably  inconsistent  with  sceptical  principle  –  is  superficial.  Reid  is
disingenuous in his characterization of both the conduct and the principle; and it
seems fair to conclude that his accusations of inconsistency between them are part
of his polemic, not his reasoned arguments, against scepticism. (De Bary 2002: 12)
11 As several commentators have argued, however, this dismissal seems too quick; arguably,
it rests on a mistaken view of just what Reid’s point here is. Specifically, and as with
Wolterstorff’s  objection above,  the present criticism overlooks how Reid conceives of
belief and its relation to action. For, given Reid’s views on the latter, his point is not
merely that the sceptic’s practice is inconsistent with his theory; it is, rather, that the
sceptic’s behavior manifests an inconsistency among beliefs.8 This is not because, as Reid
sees it, for some first-order proposition such as that there is a cup on the table the sceptic
believes p in practice but, at the level of theory, believes not-p (Ferreira 1986: 129). As has
been  pointed  out,  sceptical  doubts  aren’t  typically  directed  at  such  first-order
propositions at all. What the sceptic means to call into question is whether those beliefs
are reliably formed, justified, or apt to constitute knowledge.9 But it is precisely here, it
has been suggested, that Reid means to locate the inconsistency in question: not only
must – as hardly anyone denies – the sceptic form the relevant first-order beliefs, he
cannot sustain the theoretical metabelief about such first-order beliefs’ supposed lack of
justification (Ferreira 1986: 129). For the formation of a given perceptual belief carries
with it an implicit commitment to the trustworthiness of the testimony of the senses:10
We are born under a necessity of trusting to our reasoning and judging powers; and
a real belief of their being fallacious cannot be maintained for any considerable
time by the greatest sceptic, because it is doing violence to our constitution. It is
like a man’s walking upon his hands, a feat which some men upon occasion can
exhibit; but no man ever made a long journey in this manner. Cease to admire his
dexterity, and he will, like other men, betake himself to his legs. (Reid 1785: 6.5, p.
481)
12 D. D. Todd summarizes the point as follows:
Reid’s  […]  view is  that  belief  and  practice  are  conceptually  so  related  that  any
practice will  have a necessary connection with some belief  or other so that the
pragmatic  inconsistency  between the  sceptics’  second-order  philosophical  belief
(that our first-order common-sense beliefs are all unjustifiable) and his first-order
practice (cum belief) is really an inconsistency between belief and belief, i.e., the
sceptics’  pragmatic  inconsistency  is  a  form  of  concealed  logical  inconsistency.
(Todd 1992: 168) 
13 Suppose that this is correct.  Suppose, that is,  that we are “born under a necessity of
trusting to our reasoning and judging powers,” and that this shows that the sceptic will
inevitably confront an intra-theoretical inconsistency – an inconsistency, that is, between
his explicit theory, and the implicit theory manifested in his practice (Ferreira 1986: 133).
Now, a further objection arises:  even if we can’t  help believing that our faculties are
reliable and/or that they issue in justified beliefs, and so even if any sceptic who puts
forward a theory suggesting otherwise is bound to have inconsistent beliefs, that does not
show that the former belief, or the particular beliefs formed in accordance with the first
principles, are justified. In short, what positive reason do we have for regarding such beliefs
Judgment and Practice in Reid and Wittgenstein
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
4
as justified? Hookway expresses just  this  concern in response to Peirce’s  well-known
claim that “[w]e cannot begin with complete doubt,” and that any attempt to do so “will
be mere self-deception” (CP 5.265):
[such claims] appear to be psychological  statements about how we describe and
conduct inquiries: unless supplemented by further argument, they do not establish
that so conducting them is legitimate […]. 
[A]  common-sense  philosophy  must  explain  why  it  is  legitimate  to  trust  these
certainties.  This  is  the  fundamental  difficulty  facing  a  philosophical  appeal  to
common-sense. (Hookway 1990: 398-9)11
14 As we’ve just seen, the same concern arises in the case of Reid; and, according to some, he
never provides any satisfactory response to it. Thus, for example, Galen Strawson writes:
On this,  as on so many questions, there is a sense in which Reid merely rotates
Hume through 90 degrees: a fact noted by Sir James Mackintosh in 1812, when he
remarked to Thomas Brown that on the question of the existence of the external
world Reid and Hume “differed more in words than in opinion.” “Yes,” answered
Brown.  “Reid  bawled  out,  We  must  believe  an  outward  world;  but  added  in  a
whisper,  We can give no reason for our belief.  Hume cries out,  We can give no
reason for such a notion and whispers, I own we cannot get rid of it.” (Strawson
1990: 15)
15 As against such an assessment,  however,  many have seen Reid as offering a real and
positive  advance  beyond  the  position  of  Hume,  and  a  real  justification  of  the  first
principles.  Among such interpreters,  some have seen Reid’s  position on this score as
having a significant pragmatist element, and one that goes beyond the Peircean ideas
about  belief  and  doubt  already  scouted.  In  the  next  §,  we’ll  consider  several  such
suggestions, and I’ll enter my own proposal as to the real, and most fundamental, respect
in which Reid’s epistemological views exhibit a pragmatic character.
 
3. Pragmatism, Narrow and Broad12
16 Just what pragmatism amounts to is a matter of much dispute, partly owing to the fact
that its proponents have held some subtle views, and on a whole broad range of topics,
with plenty of significant disagreements among them. Here, Robert Brandom provides a
helpful suggestion:
Pragmatism  can  be  thought  of  narrowly:  as  a  philosophical  school  of  thought
centered  on  evaluating  beliefs  by  their  tendency  to  promote  success  at  the
satisfaction of wants, whose paradigmatic practitioners were the classical American
triumvirate of Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey. But pragmatism can
also be thought of more broadly: as a movement centered on the primacy of the
practical. (Brandom 2002: 40)
17 The latter idea – what we might call the primacy of practice – figures centrally as well in
Hilary Putnam’s discussions of pragmatism. According to Putnam, along with an anti-
sceptical  and  fallibilist  outlook,  and  a  suspiciousness  of  any  fundamental  fact/value
dichotomy, what’s most attractive and worth retaining in pragmatism is “the thesis that,
in a certain sense, practice is primary in philosophy” (Putnam 1994: 52; cf. 1995: 42-52).
Stanley Cavell concurs: “I think we must agree that something like this emphasis [viz., on
the primacy of practice] is definitive for pragmatism” (Cavell 1998: 76).
18 Now,  in  terms  of  Brandom’s  distinction  between  narrow  and  broad  conceptions  of
pragmatism, in providing a justification for the first principles and the beliefs formed in
accordance with them, some have seen Reid as relying upon, suggesting, or needing help
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from, an element of pragmatism narrowly conceived. That is, it has been suggested that
Reid relies  upon (or  suggests,  or  needs)  the idea that  we should evaluate beliefs,  or
meaning,  in  terms  of  practical  success.  As  we’ll  see,  each  such  suggestion  faces
difficulties, opening up space for understanding Reid as relying upon pragmatist ideas
broadly construed – that is, upon the idea that practice is primary.
19 To begin here, consider the following passage in which, having noted that it is not in his
power to distrust his senses, Reid writes:
I think it would not be prudent to throw off this belief, if it were in my power […] I
resolve not to believe my senses. I break my nose against a post that comes in my
way; I step into a dirty kennel; and, after twenty such wise rational actions, I am
taken up and clapped into a mad-house. Now, I confess I would rather make one of
the credulous fools whom Nature imposes upon, than of those wise and rational
philosophers who resolve to withhold assent at all this expense. (Reid 1764: 6.20, p.
170)
20 Clearly, this passage is thought by Reid to have anti-sceptical import. But why, exactly?
One suggestion is that Reid is here not really offering an epistemological justification for
the relevant beliefs at all. According to Peter Baumann, for example, “Reid’s theory of
common  sense  implicitly  contains  a  dilemma”  (Baumann  1999:  47).  Since  the  first
principles are first principles, we cannot argue for them directly – at least, not on the
basis of anything more fundamental.13 But it doesn’t follow that any such principles are
true;  and neither,  as  we saw above,  does the inevitability of  the relevant beliefs  put
scepticism to rest. So, we face a dilemma: we can continue to make truth and knowledge
claims about the first principles of common sense, while acknowledging that we have no
justification for doing so (dogmatism), or we can refrain from making any such claims and
content ourselves with believing these things, perhaps inevitably, without any pretense
to our being justified in doing so (scepticism) (Baumann 1999: 51). Clearly, neither of these
options will be attractive for Reid. So, Baumann says, “[t]here must be a third way for
him” (Baumann 1999:  52).  According to Baumann, this third way,  of  which there are
“hints” in Reid, is “the pragmatist way out” (Baumann 1999: 52):
Even if we cannot give justifying reasons for our principles of knowledge, we can
give a totally different kind of justification: a pragmatic justification. The principles
of common sense enable us to build theories which guide our actions and let us
attain our goals. Insofar as they fulfill this function, they are justified and there is
no  place  for  a  different  kind  of  justification,  no  need  to  talk  about  truth  or
knowledge. (Baumann 1999: 53)
21 Of course, as Baumann says, Reid “does not make this last step” (ibid.). But “he is very
close to this kind of pragmatism” (ibid.), and something like ‘the pragmatist way out’ is
needed here, given our inability to provide a non-pragmatic, epistemic justification for the
first principles.
22 Baumann’s proposal is not without its problems. For one, Reid does seem to regard the
first principles as epistemically, and not merely pragmatically, justified. For another, that
the principles of common sense are practically useful is itself an empirical claim, the
epistemic standing of which is as open to sceptical questioning as any. In response to the
latter concern, Baumann clarifies that his argument “does not involve any […] claims
about the factual usefulness of common sense” (Baumann 2004: 75). All that’s required
are conditional judgments: “If the external world exists, then it is a more dangerous place
for sceptics than for the followers of common sense. Given that we prefer not to break
our noses, common sense is better off – given the existence of the external world – than
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scepticism. If the external world does not exist, then there is no difference between the
two  positions  in  terms  of  practical  outcomes.  Hence,  common  sense  ‘dominates’
scepticism.” (Baumann 2004: p. 75). Once again, however, it’s likely that Reid would see
this argument as putting things in the wrong light. For Reid emphasizes the fact that the
first principles are all on a par (e.g., 1764: 6.20, pp. 168-9; 1785: 6.4, pp. 463-4). Whereas,
the propounding of the decision-theoretic argument for trusting our perceptual faculties,
even  if  it  aims  only  at  pragmatic  justification,  takes  the  reliability  of  reasoning  in
particular for granted. But, Reid asks:
Why, sir, should I believe the faculty of reason more than that of perception? – they
came both out of the same shop, and were made by the same artist; if he puts one
piece of false ware into my hands, what should hinder him from putting another?
(1764: 6.20, p. 169)
23 A different proposal as to the pragmatic character of Reid’s response to scepticism is
discussed by Adrian Sackson.14 The proposal is that, in passages like that cited above, Reid
is implicitly relying upon something like Peirce’s famous ‘prope-positivist’ maxim:
Consider  what  effects,  which  might  conceivably  have  practical  bearings,  we
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of those effects
is the whole of our conception of the object. (e.g., CP 5.2, 5.402, 5.438) 
24 Thus, as applied to the present case: “Even if nature is actually ‘imposing’ on me this is
irrelevant, since my interactions with the ‘incorrectly’ perceived world around me can
still  cause me very tangible suffering – for  instance,  in the form of  a  broken nose.”
(Sackson 2014: §6). But if there is no practical difference in outcome hinging on whether
scepticism is  true,  then  “there  is  no  justification in  speaking  of  a  difference  in  the
concepts” (ibid.: §16). On this reading, then, Reid’s argument “amounts to a pragmatist
rejection of  any distinction between Scepticism and anti-Scepticism which entails  no
difference in practical effects” (ibid.: §30).
25 It is doubtful, however, that Reid would accept this construal of his argument, taken at
the letter. Reid does hold that ordinary use is “the arbiter of language” (Reid 1785: 1.1,
p. 35); but this falls far short of the idea that the meaning of a term or concept – much
less, in the manner of William James, whether a given belief is true15 – is to be understood
in terms of practical effects.16 So too, as we’ve seen, Reid does distinguish between real
and merely professed doubt, and he thinks that genuine sceptics are an extremely rare
breed. We could, if  we like, cast this as a point about whether the views of one who
(merely) professes scepticism are really ‘meaningful,’ in a more colloquial sense of the
term. We could wonder, that is, whether scepticism is a ‘real position’ (i.e., one that’s
seriously believed by its proponents), and not a merely theoretical or “paper” view. But
this, on its own, falls short of a face-value application of the prope-positivist maxim. 
26 As  I  am understanding  Reid,  then,  when he  says,  “I  would  rather  make  one  of  the
credulous fools whom Nature imposes upon, than of those wise and rational philosophers
who resolve to withhold assent at all this expense” (Reid 1764: 6.20, p. 170), the claim is
heavy  with  irony,  even  ridicule.17 I’d  rather  be  ‘imposed  upon,’ he’s  saying,  as  some
(misguided) philosophers worry I might be – that is, I’d rather believe my senses and not come to
harm  –  than  be  ‘wise  and  rational’  and  end  up  injured  and/or  institutionalized.  If  we  are
massively  deceived,  however,  all  is  not still  well.  For  instance,  of  the  idea  that  our
sensations  suggest  something  external,  Reid  says:  “The  belief  of  it,  and  the  very
conception of it, are equally parts of our constitution. If we are deceived in it, we are
deceived by Him that made us, and there is no remedy.” (Reid 1764: 5.7, p. 72). Not, note,
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there’s no real difference here, since I’d still suffer harms if I don’t trust my senses; but, there is no
remedy.
27 In short, whatever its merits, the prope-positivist semantic rejection of scepticism, like a
purely pragmatic justification based on the (presumed) utility of acting in a non-sceptical
manner, seems far removed from Reid’s own views.
28 In light of  the results of  this § thus far,  it’s  not surprising that some have seen the
pragmatic character of Reid’s philosophy as extending only so far. Thus, for example, Eric
Lundestad argues that Reid’s philosophy does contain real ‘proto-pragmatic’ elements,
especially ones present in Peirce’s ‘critical common-sensism’ – for instance, a distinction
between  real  versus  merely  professed  doubt  (Lundestad  2006:  131;  2008:  177),  an
insistence that the lack of a positive justification for certain beliefs does not itself imply
doubt (Lundestad 2006: 130), and the observation that inquiry in any form arises and is
carried out against the background of certain theories,  beliefs and methods – certain
practices (Lundestad  2006:  131).  According  to  Lundestad,  however,  both  a  genuine
pragmatism and  the  avoidance  of  dilemmas  of  the  sort  Baumann  describes  are  not
possible from within a Reidian common sense framework, which “explicitly encourages
dogmatism” (Lundestad 2006: 128), and ignores the distinction between “the quaestio facti
and the quaestio juris” (Lundestad 2008: 179). However, if we move away from the Reidian
idea “that commonsensical beliefs may be taken as true because they are inherent to our
nature” (Lundestad 2006: 132) and adopt “the pragmatic shift from theory to practice,”
the latter distinction becomes one that is drawn within experience: some practices ‘work,’
others do not; the former receive ‘corroboration.’ When a practice proves problematic,
we may then make it an object of attention, and “the validity of this belief can only be
settled  by  way  of  justification”  in  terms  of  its  practical  efficacy.  This  non-Reidian
approach may not be without its problems, Lundestad says, but “there is no other way of
overcoming the stalemate of common sense than by continuing to develop it” (Lundestad
2008: 184-6).
29 What should we to make of this? Does responding to scepticism require a shift away from
Reidian common sensism, and towards a more thoroughgoing pragmatism? Only, I want
now to suggest, if we are thinking of pragmatism in the narrow sense, as described above
– i.e.,  only if we are thinking of pragmatism chiefly in terms of a focus on ‘practical’
matters  such  as  the  apparent  benefits  or  effects  of  certain  ways  of  acting.  If  we’re
thinking of things in this way, then the presence, or addition, of a significant pragmatist
element – again, narrowly conceived – is bound to run counter to Reid’s stated views in
one or another way. Whereas, if we think of pragmatism more broadly, as a movement
centered on the idea that practice is somehow primary,  it  becomes clear that what’s
perhaps  the  strongest  strain  of  pragmatism in  Reid  is  continuous  with,  and  in  fact
inseparable  from,  his  stated views –  including,  and especially,  his  views on common
sense. 
30 To begin, consider common sense. Colloquially, ‘common sense’ is often used to refer to
whatever it is that’s widely regarded as true (‘vulgar opinion,’ as Reid sometimes calls it).
But Reid intends something rather narrower than this. In our discussion thus far, both
Reid and his critics often speak of common sense as a specific subset of our naturally-held
beliefs, or as those things that are so believed. But even this is not what’s fundamental for
Reid. According to Reid, ‘sense’ is closely connected with judgment: “in common language,
sense always implies judgment. A man of sense is a man of judgment. Good sense is good
judgment” (Reid 1785: 6.2, p. 424). On the relation between common sense and reason,
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Reid says that common sense is a “degree” of reason – specifically, that it is that degree of
reason  which  is  requisite  for  judging  “of  things  self-evident,”  including  the  first
principles,  and which entitles humans “to the denomination of reasonable creatures”
(Reid  1785: 6.2,  p. 433).  So,  common  sense  is  a  specific  capacity  for  judgment,  and
shouldn’t be identified with the judgments and beliefs that flow from it,  or with the
propositions thus believed.
31 Already, note, we have the suggestion of the mixing of facts and values that Putnam
associates with pragmatism (see above): ‘common sense’ is not merely descriptive – it
suggests  reasonableness,  for  instance.  Also  notable,  especially  in  connection  with  a
consideration of Reid’s relation to pragmatism, is the fact that common sense straddles –
in fact, it unifies – the theory/practice distinction. Common sense enables us to judge “of
things self-evident”; but a reasonable person is just as much one who “live[s] and act[s]
according to the rules of common prudence” (Reid 1785: 1.2, p. 39) and is “capable of
managing his own affairs, and answerable for his conduct towards others” (Reid 1785: 6.2,
p. 433);  it  is  “that  degree of  judgment which is  common to men with whom we can
converse and transact business” (Reid 1785: 6.2, p. 424). As far as common sense goes,
then, there is no neat division between theory and practice, practical and theoretical
rationality, or the standards of reasonableness that govern everyday life and those that
the philosopher should observe:
The  same  degree  of  understanding  which  makes  a  man  capable  of  acting  with
common prudence in the conduct of life, makes him capable of discovering what is
true and what  is  false  in  matters  that  are  self-evident,  and which he distinctly
apprehends. (Reid 1785: 6.2, p. 426)
[W]hat  is  absurd  at  the  bar  is  so  in  the  philosopher’s  chair.  What  would  be
ridiculous,  if  delivered to  a  jury  of  honest  sensible  citizens,  is  no  less  so  when
delivered gravely in a philosophical dissertation. (Reid 1785: 6.2, p. 475)
32 The mixing of psychological and normative ideas that characterizes Reid’s conception of
common sense is present as well in his views on evidence (Rysiew 2005, 2011a). When
Reid says that the different kinds of evidence “are all fitted by nature to produce belief in
the human mind” (Reid 1785: 2.20, p. 229), he clearly means that they produce belief in
the  sound  or  healthy human mind.  However,  it  seems  to  be  Reid’s  view we have  no
standard of cognitive ‘health,’ or of the properly functioning subject, that’s completely
independent  of  our  most  deeply  held  beliefs and  our  most  fundamental  epistemic
practices: a significant departures from the first principles, or a failure to form beliefs in
accordance with them, is not just unusual; it disqualifies one from being a “reasonable
creature” – it’s madness: 
A remarkable deviation from [such natural and original judgments which constitute
the principles  of  common sense],  arising from a disorder in the constitution,  is
what we call lunacy […]. (Reid 1764: 7, p. 215)18
33 Nor is this just a stipulative matter. For, in the absence of any reasonable (i.e., evidence-
based) doubt as to their truth, we have no reasonable alternative to accepting the dictates
of common sense. And since any evidence as to the fallaciousness of one or all of our
faculties would have to presume the veracity of at least one of them, given that the first
principles  are  all  on  a  par,  such  evidence  would  in  fact  undermine  the  attempted
argument. (So, there is an inconsistency among such a sceptic’s commitments here as
well.) In this sense, there could not be any reasonable (evidence-based) doubt as to the
truth of the first principles.19 In this way, the first principles are constitutive principles
(Rysiew 2002): accepting them is a condition – for us, given our nature – of cognizing at
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all. And insofar as it is rational to act on and believe that to which there is not – indeed,
could not be – any reasonable alternative, it’s rational for us to hold to the first principles
of common sense.
34 Are the first principles really ‘self-evident,’ however, as Reid claims? “Can we really,”
Alston  asks  doubtfully,  “see  them to  be  true  just  by  understanding  their  content?”
(Alston 1985: 439). Or is there not, in Reid, simply a failure to observe the distinction
“between self-evidence and being strongly inclined to believe the proposition without
question” (Alston 1986: 4)? Once again, however, and independently of whether Reid’s
first  principles  really  are  ‘self-evident’  “in  the  classical  sense”  of  the  term,  as  van
Woudenberg (2013: 87) puts it, a further possibility is that Reid’s view is, as Alston himself
elsewhere puts  it,  that  “in a  sense,  there is  no appeal  beyond the practices  we find
ourselves engaged in” (Alston 1993: 130; cf. 1989). Thus, while the distinction between
self-evidence and merely being strongly inclined to believe a proposition is real, and is
easy to draw at the level of non-basic propositions (e.g., whether I’m going to win the
lottery), since the first principles are first principles, their being self-evident and our all
being  strongly  inclined  to  believe  them  are,  as  one  might  expect,  not  in  practice
separable. And so too, on this reading, for our accepting the first principles and our being
justified in accepting them: they typify,  even define,  what (self-)evidentness is  for us,
given  our  constitution.  The  simple  (apparent)  manifestness  of  certain  things,  the
bruteness of certain such judgments, is in the end the final court of epistemic appeal.
Both the sceptic and the dogmatist fail to see this, however: both hold, if only implicitly,
that epistemic justification requires an appeal to something deeper – hence their common
belief that the first principles and the beliefs they undergird are without justification.
35 It’s a large and important question how plausible the view I’ve just sketched is, both as a
reading  of  Reid,  and  as  an  independently  plausible  position.20 For  present  purposes,
however,  what’s  most  important  is  that,  insofar  as  that  view  has  some  prima  facie
plausibility as an interpretation of Reid, it provides an understanding of his relation to
pragmatism, and of the relation of common sense to the pragmatist elements of his views,
that  differs  significantly  from  the  discussions  canvassed  above.  Specifically,  as  with
pragmatism broadly construed, along with his anti-scepticism and his regarding certain
central epistemic notions having both descriptive and normative aspects, there is a good
sense  in  which  practice  –  in  particular,  our  natural  and  basic  ways  of  forming  and
evaluating beliefs; what Alston (1989) calls our ‘doxastic practices’ – is primary for Reid.
But common sense, as we’ve seen, is deeply implicated in those fundamental practices: it
supplies the ‘good judgment’ that leads us to accept the first principles, to form beliefs in
accordance with them, and to think and act the part of reasonable creatures.21 Thus, far
from  being  at  odds  with,  or  needing  supplementation  by,  the  relevant  pragmatist
elements in Reid, common sense is inseparable therefrom.
36 In the next §, I present a preliminary case that something very much like this is true of
Wittgenstein’s later work as well. While the discussion will be briefer than the preceding
discussion of Reid, it’s hoped that it will be plausible and interesting enough to suggest
that the ideas therein merit further investigation.
 
4. Judgment and Practice in Wittgenstein
37 A number of writers22 have noted significant similarities to Reid in Wittgenstein’s later
philosophical works, and especially in the notes collected and published posthumously
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under the title On Certainty. In the latter work, Wittgenstein’s concern is to get clear on
the nature and epistemic  status  of  propositions  of  the sort  that  Moore (1925,  1939),
famously,  sought  to  defend.  Whether  these  notes  contain  a  single  and  cohesive
philosophical view, and if so the precise character thereof, is of course a matter of much
controversy. Here, I don’t pretend to be offering anything like a systematic treatment of
the relevant writings, the correct interpretation of which is a matter of lively debate. The
concern, rather, is with some quite general and clearly discernable features of that work –
and, in particular, with the general such features that constitute significant points of
agreement with Reidian ideas described above.
38 Thus, just as, for familiar regress-related reasons, Reid takes it as obvious that there must
be ‘first principles’ (e.g., 1785: 1.2, p. 39), and just as he rejects as both impossible and
unreasonable the demands of Cartesian epistemology, Wittgenstein thinks that complete
doubt makes no sense – in any inquiry, there must among our starting points be some
things of which we are certain: 
If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The
game of doubting itself presupposes certainty. (Wittgenstein 1969: §115; cf. §§114,
315, 322, 354, 450, 519)
A doubt without an end is not even a doubt. (Wittgenstein 1969: §625)
If the shopkeeper wanted to investigate each of his apples without any reason, for
the sake of being certain about everything, why doesn’t he have to investigate the
investigation? (Wittgenstein 1969: §459)23
39 So, as with Reid (and Peirce), the mere possibility of error is not a reason to doubt (1969:
§4): “we are not in doubt because it is possible for us to imagine a doubt” (Wittgenstein
1953: §84). Rather, it must be that one doubts on specific grounds (Wittgenstein 1969:
§§458, 122, 323, 519). And those grounds, in turn, must be grounded on things we do not
doubt:  “the  questions that  we  raise  and  our  doubts depend  on  the  fact  that  some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn”
(Wittgenstein 1969: §341); “We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we
are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must
stay put.” (Wittgenstein 1969: §343). Further, the preceding are not merely descriptive
points.  Rather,  our  pretheoretic  certainties  have  a  certain  type  of  authority,  in  that
serious  departures  from  them  aren’t  just  atypical,  indeed  not  merely  mistakes,  but
madness:
If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which he declares
certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as
demented. (Wittgenstein 1969: §155; cf. § 71)
In order to make a mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with mankind.
(Wittgenstein 1969: §156)
This does indeed point to one kind of use for “I know.” “I know it is so” then means:
It is so, or else I’m crazy. (Wittgenstein 1981: §408)
40 As with Reid’s first principles, the relevant propositions are seldom made the object of
thought – most likely, we think of them only when a philosopher brings them to our
attention. Even so, they implicitly govern the relevant forms of activity, cognitive and
otherwise. So too, just as Reid says that “[m]en need not be taught” (Reid 1785: 1.2, p. 39)
the first principles, the relevant propositions according to Wittgenstein are not things in
which we’re instructed (Wittgenstein 1969:  §§152-3,  e.g.),  and are not the product of
experience  (Wittgenstein  1969:  §§130-1).  Rather,  they  are  ‘swallowed  down,’  as
consequences, in the course of learning the things we do (Wittgenstein 1969: §143). The
propositions in question make up the ‘frame of reference’ (Wittgenstein 1969: §83) or
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‘inherited background’ (Wittgenstein 1969: §94) in terms of which we learn, make sense of
experiences, and so forth. There is nothing more certain that could serve as reason either
for or against them. (“What is to be tested by what?” [Wittgenstein 1969: §125].) Because
they have such a fundamental status, if we could doubt any of Moore’s propositions, we
would have no reason not to doubt anything else, including the reliability of our senses: 
If a blind man were to ask me “Have you got two hands?” I should not make sure by
looking. If I were to have any doubt of it, then I don’t know why I should trust my
eyes. For why shouldn’t I test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two
hands? (Wittgenstein 1969: §125; cf. 1953: 221)
41 Here,  the  entire  framework  within  which  we  raise  doubts  and  answer  them  would
collapse – it would be an “annihilation of all yardsticks” (Wittgenstein 1969: §492; cf.
§§125,  234,  308,  419,  490,  506,  507,  514,  613,  614,  672).  The fact  is,  though,  that  the
“reasonable man does not have certain doubts” (Wittgenstein 1969: §220).
42 As noted above, as with the specific character of Reid’s epistemology, ‘the epistemology of
hinges’ is a matter of lively debate, with similar issues at the center of each. Thus, just as
with Reid’s first principles, there is debate about our attitude towards hinge propositions
– whether it is one of belief and, if so, whether such beliefs are propositional; so too, and
again as with Reid, there is debate as to the epistemic standing of the relevant attitude –
whether/why it  is  warranted,  exactly,  whether it  constitutes knowledge,  and so on.24
Once again, however, of special interest here are the apparent broad similarities between
Reid and (the later) Wittgenstein as regards pragmatism and common sense. Beginning
with the former, while many have found “a distinct pragmatic streak” in Wittgenstein’s
later work (Passmore 1966: 424),25 it’s fairly clear that Wittgenstein, like Reid, rejects the
view – and so, e.g., the response to scepticism – that meaning or truth is a matter of
utility or practical effects. Very briefly: while he had earlier (1961) taken naming to be the
model of meaning, in his later philosophy Wittgenstein recommends that, in most cases,
the meaning of a term is best explained by describing its use (Wittgenstein 1953: §43). But
this  is  distinct  from a  general  identification  of  meaning  and  use;  much  less  is  it  an
identification of meaning with practical effects. 
43 Wittgenstein also explicitly rejects a Jamesian conception of truth:
But you aren’t a pragmatist? No. For I am not saying that a proposition is true if it is
useful. (Wittgenstein 1980: §266)
44 And he likewise denies that  ‘hinge propositions,’  and/or the practices in which they
figure, have an essentially pragmatic justification: 
No, experience is not the ground for our game of judging. Nor is its outstanding
success. (Wittgenstein 1969: §131)
This game proves its worth. That may be the cause of its being played, but it is not
the ground. (Wittgenstein 1969: §474)
45 In short, in terms of Brandom’s distinction, Wittgenstein, no less than Reid, seems not to
accept pragmatism narrowly conceived (cf. Goodman 1998: 102-3; Moyal-Sharrock 2004:
171). Yet – and again, as with Reid – there does seem to be a heavy strain of the broad 
form of pragmatism discussed earlier (cf. Moyal-Sharrock 2004: 172).26 Thus, while (as in
some of the passages above) Wittgenstein like Reid often speaks of the special character
of certain propositions, as in Reid this is not separable from the role they play in action
(cf. Goodman 1998: 94; e.g., Wittgenstein 1969: §§120, 144, 204, 342, 402). Further, it is not
particular actions, but rather the more general practices in which they are embedded –
our taking certain sorts  of  things but not others to constitute evidence,  grounds for
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doubt, legitimate forms of inquiry, and so on (e.g., Wittgenstein 1969: §§105, 151, 185, 231,
497, 608) – on which both explanations and justifications ultimately ground out: 
the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.
(Wittgenstein 1969: §110)
If  I  have  exhausted  the  justifications  I  have  reached  bedrock,  and  my spade  is
turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.” (Wittgenstein 1953:
§217)
What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life. (Wittgenstein
1953: 226)
Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens
as a ‘proto-phenomenon.’ That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game
is played. (Wittgenstein 1953: §654)
The danger here, I believe, is one of giving a justification of our procedure when
there is no such thing as a justification and we ought simply to have said: that’s how
we do it. (Wittgenstein 1967: II, §74)
The essence of the language game is a practical method (a way of acting) – not
speculation, not chatter. (Wittgenstein 1993: §399)
46 Thus, while Wittgenstein’s concern is to get clear on the nature and epistemic status of
propositions  of  the  sort  that  Moore  sought  to  defend,  his  own  view  is  that  such
propositions are not themselves what’s fundamental. Even if they have a special status
therein, ‘hinges’ are not separable from our practices; in fact, in some good sense they
owe their special status to the latter: “hinges are what they are in virtue of a human
practice that  has  developed as  it  has” (Coliva 2016:  94);  they are “rooted,  albeit  not
ratiocinatively, in our human form of life and in the various forms of human life” (Moyal-
Sharrock 2016: 110).
47 Of course, we have yet to mention common sense here. In fact, as Nyíri (2015) notes,
Wittgenstein does not use ‘common sense’ – or its German equivalent – in On Certainty
(though he does in other places).27 But that common sense is not an explicit part of the
story doesn’t mean that it’s not deeply implicated therein. On the contrary: if, as I’ve just
suggested, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy illustrates ‘the primacy of practice,’ the latter
in turn is inseparable from what, to a reader of Reid, would look very much like the
latter’s  common sense – that  is,  a  capacity for  good judgment that  operates in both
thought and action and entitles us “to the denomination of reasonable creatures” (Reid
1785: 6.2, p. 433). 
48 Thus,  in  attempting  to  clarify  the  status  of  Moore-style  propositions,  Wittgenstein
frequently  invokes  the  idea  of  the  reasonable  person  as somehow fundamental.  For
instance,
There cannot be any doubt about it for me as a reasonable person. – That’s it. –
(Wittgenstein 1969: §219)
The reasonable man does not have certain doubts. (Wittgenstein 1969: §220)
Our not doubting [Moore-style propositions] is simply our manner of judging, and
therefore of acting. (Wittgenstein 1969: §232)
49 The latter passage, note, no less that the earlier-noted emphasis on action, makes clear
that  there’s  no  hard-and-fast  theory/practice  distinction  here  –  like  the  most-often
implicit beliefs Reid speaks of, the relevant judgments for Wittgenstein are not mere dry
intellectual verdicts; they govern our actions, cognitive and otherwise. The passages just
above also illustrate the close connection between the idea of the reasonable person and
the  fundamentality  of  certain  shared  judgments,  including  ‘agreements  in  judgment’
(Wittgenstein 1953: §§241-242) as to what is to count as certain, as evidence, or as reason
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to doubt (cf. Ferreira 1986: 118). As Wittgenstein puts it, “We use judgments as principles
of judgment” (Wittgenstein 1969: §124). 
I am not more certain of the meaning of my words than I am of certain judgments
[…]. (Wittgenstein 1969: §126)
From a child on up I learnt to judge like this. This is judging. (Wittgenstein 1969:
§128)
This is how I learned to judge; this I got to know as judgment. (Wittgenstein 1969:
§129; cf. §§140, 149)
50 In short, as was suggested earlier in the case of Reid, it seems to be Wittgenstein’s view
that we have no standard of cognitive ‘health,’ reasonableness, or good judgment, that’s
prior to and independent of our firmest judgments, most deeply held commitments, and
our most fundamental epistemic practices. A significant departure from the latter, or a
failure to form beliefs in accordance with them, is not just a mistake; it disqualifies one
from being a “reasonable creature.” Thus, while the language of ‘common sense’ is not
employed, something very much like the Reidian conception thereof is naturally seen as
operative, even central, here.
51 In spite of these apparent similarities between Reid’s and Wittgenstein’s views, it might
seem as though there’s an obvious difference. For Reid’s first principles – that certain
types of things exist, that our natural faculties are not fallacious, etc. – appear to be quite
general. Relatedly, and setting aside the worry of whether they really are believed (see
above), they appear to be the sort of thing a commitment to which really could be common
. The latter is a feature Reid stresses: the commonness of common sense itself, and of the
first principles for which it vouches, is what explains our being able to communicate,
argue,  and transact  business  with one another  (e.g.,  1785:  1.2,  p. 39;  6.4,  pp. 459-60).
Whereas, many of the propositions Wittgenstein discusses as having a special status – that
one lives in a certain city (Wittgenstein 1969: §67), or at a certain address (Wittgenstein 1969:
§70); that one has never been to Asia Minor (Wittgenstein 1969: §116), etc. – clearly won’t
have that status for all: some have been to Asia Minor, some haven’t; and that I [in my case:
Patrick Rysiew] am a human being is something that has no part in the vast majority of
human  lives.28 In  short,  there  appears  to  be  much  more  variation, and  much  less
common-ness, amongst Wittgenstein’s ‘hinges’ than there is in the case of Reid’s first
principles.  And if  there’s  no common-ness,  what’s  the point  of  speaking of  common
sense?
52 The response is,  I  take it,  clear enough. While many of the relevant propositions are
stated in the first person, Wittgenstein holds that “[t]here is something universal here;
not just something personal” (Wittgenstein 1969: §440; Greco 2016: 310-1). (“We might
speak of fundamental principles of human enquiry,” Wittgenstein says (1969: §670).) For
example, that I [PR] am a human being is such that, if I know it of myself, every person
knows it of him/herself (Wittgenstein 1969: §100). In the same manner, that I’ve never been
to Asia Minor is something such that, if I know it of myself, then so does every normal,
sane person who’s had the relevant similar life experiences. And then too, there are some
‘hinges’ that are more obviously impersonal and shared – e.g., that there are physical objects
(Wittgenstein 1969: §35), or that what has always happened will happen again (or something
like it) (Wittgenstein 1969: §135); and these in turn can ground more specific judgments
(e.g., that if I light a fire, it will warm us up), which might themselves function as certainties
in more local contexts. In short, it’s natural to see the more specific-seeming hinges as
being under-written by more general ones, with the latter being more obviously held in
common by all reasonable people, just as Reid’s first principles are said to be.29
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53 As we began by noting, a number of philosophers have remarked on the close affinity
between the epistemological  views of  Reid and those of  the later Wittgenstein.  Here,
while doing my best to remain neutral as to the specific character of their respective
positions, I have suggested that these similarities include a shared commitment to an idea
that, according to several commentators, is central to pragmatism, broadly understood –
the idea, namely, that practice is somehow primary. Further, I have argued that while the
commitment  to  common sense is,  as  one might  expect,  much more explicit  in  Reid,
Wittgenstein too gives fundamental place to the ideas of the reasonable person and of
good judgment, as manifested in both thought and action. No doubt, plenty of questions
remain about the details of Reid’s and Wittgenstein’s views; and no doubt too, there may
be  important  differences  between  them.  Nevertheless,  in  both  figures’  work  there
appears  to  be  a  close  connection between common sense  and the  elements  in  their
thought that can be considered pragmatist in some interesting and important respect.
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NOTES
1. In Reid’s usage, a ‘proposition’ is neither an abstract object nor some complex of concrete
objects and properties; it is simply a complete sentence (see 1785: 1.8, pp. 69-70).
2. That, indeed, is why Reid thought that while ‘an anatomy of the human mind’ should be based
chiefly on accurate reflection upon the operations of one’s own mind, further vital sources of
evidence as to the mind’s basic powers and principles are the structure of language and human
conduct generally (1785: 1.5, pp. 56-57).
3. Cf. Van Cleve: “When we take for granted that a faculty is reliable, we need not believe in any
explicit  way  that  the  faculty  is  reliable.  We  need  only  have  a  disposition  to  believe  its
deliverances.” (Van Cleve 2004: 414; emphases added). Elsewhere, van Cleve seems to allow that
the latter, dispositional idea affords “one plausible sense in which ordinary subjects believe in
the reliability of their faculties” (Van Cleve 2003: 161). Sosa, meanwhile (2009: 63-67), suggests
that it does not much matter whether we call the relevant states or commitments beliefs; “[w]hat
is important is that [the] relevant states be evaluable epistemically in the usual ways” (Sosa 2009:
66).
4. The  latter  are  among  the  passages  Engel-Tiercelin  (1989)  cites  in  her  discussion  of  the
similarities between Reid’s and Peirce’s views of belief. 
5. Peirce attributes to Alexander Bain (1818-1903) the definition of a belief as “that upon which a
man is prepared to act” (CP 5.12).
6. A famous instance is Kant’s dismissal of an appeal to common sense as “one of the subtle
discoveries  of  recent  times,  whereby  the  dullest  windbag  can  confidently  take  on  the  most
profound thinker and hold his own with him” (Kant 2004: 9).
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7. As  we’ll  see  shortly,  it’s  arguable  that  Forguson and de Bary  mischaracterize  Reid’s  anti-
sceptical point. Note, however, that even if his argument is,  or involves, an ad hominem,  that
would  not  in  his  view  undercut  its  philosophical  worth.  Reid  is  explicit,  for  example,  that
arguments ad hominem can be a legitimate means of establishing that something is a genuine first
principle (1785: 6.4, p. 463).
8. In  addition  to  Ferreira  and  Todd  (see  below),  this  has been  argued  by  Cuneo  2004  and
Somerville 2002.
9. See, for example, Newman’s distinction, on behalf of Descartes (and as against Peirce), between
belief-defeating  and  justification-defeating  doubts  (Newman  2016:  §2.2).  Meyers  (1967:  19ff.)
makes essentially the same point.
10. Pritchard makes a related point: “Beliefs […] are propositional attitudes that by their nature
are responsive to rational considerations […]. This is not to say that beliefs are by their nature
rational, of course, as this is manifestly false. It is rather to say that there are certain minimal,
but constitutive nonetheless,  connections between belief  and truth such that  a  propositional
attitude that didn’t satisfy them simply would not count as a belief, but would be a different
propositional attitude entirely. In particular, it makes no sense, for example, for there to be an
agent who believes that p while taking herself to have no reason whatsoever for thinking p to be
true.” (Pritchard 2016: 90).
11. Compare de Bary, on what he describes as “the most crucial interpretative question about
Reid’s response to scepticism”: “Reid may be as correct as you please, descriptively speaking,
about  the  range  of  beliefs  that  people  instinctively  hold true;  and he  may have  arrived,  by
abstraction,  at  unerring  criteria  for  identifying  these  innate  beliefs.  But,  as  the  sceptic  will
quickly  point  out,  such  psychological  description  is  beside  the  epistemological  point.  In  the
absence of some link between […] ‘the Innateness Claim’ and ‘the Truth Claim’ for first principles,
the sceptical challenge to their warrant will not have been met.” (2002: 37).
12. The ideas of the § are presented more fully in Rysiew 2015a, which itself draws on some
earlier work. For some complementary discussion, see Jackson 2014.
13. Which is not to say that we cannot argue for them at all: some have suggested that, though
they  are  not  what  give  specific  faculties  their  status  as  sources  of  evidence,  ‘track  record’
arguments for their reliability are still possible, and that Reid himself allows for such (e.g., Lemos
2004, Thébert 2015, Van Cleve 2015); and Poore 2015, e.g., argues that the justification of a first
principle can, for Reid, be enhanced by coherence-style arguments from other first principles of
the same standing.
14. Sackson associates this proposal with P. D. Magnus’ ‘argument from practical commitment.’
According to the latter, “the so-called sceptic betrays a belief in the real world by managing their
affairs just as common folk do” (Magnus 2004: 71). “If sceptics see that their practice implies
certain beliefs, then they are left with a choice of abstaining from their practice or accepting the
beliefs. Reid’s argument cannot force their choice, but it makes them pay a higher price if they
cleave to scepticism” (ibid.; cf. Magnus 2008: 6-7). As I understand it, Magnus’ argument does not
rely  on  any controversial  claims  about  the  (literal)  meaningfulness of  scepticism.  The  central
claim, rather, recalls the discussion of the previous § as to the tenability or reasonableness of the
view  –  which,  we  have  been  supposing,  does  not  itself  yield  a  positive  justification  for  the
relevant beliefs.
15. “The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too,
for definite assignable reasons” (James 1907: 42).
16. Reid’s views on meaning, and on language generally, are discussed in Rysiew 2015b.
17. Note that, as Giovanni Grandi 2008 has argued, Reid rejects non-epistemic conceptions of
ridicule: according to Reid, it involves not just feeling but judgment, and is an important and
legitimate tool of criticism.
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18. The passage continues, in a manner recalling the discussion of the previous §: “When a man
suffers  himself  to  be  reasoned  out  of  the  principles  of  common  sense,  by  metaphysical
arguments, we may call this metaphysical lunacy; which differs from the other species of the
distemper in this, that it is not continued, but intermittent it is apt to seize the patient in solitary
and  speculative  moments;  but,  when  he  enters  into  society,  Common  Sense  recovers  her
authority.” (Ibid.).
19. Which is not to say that it’s impossible, as Reid puts it, “for what is only a vulgar prejudice
[to] be mistaken for a first principle” (Reid 1785: 1.2, p. 41). In general, Reid readily embraces
both our fallibility and fallibilism about epistemic matters. 
20. Elsewhere (2002, 2005, 2011a, forthcoming), I’ve begun to make a case that it is both of these
things.  Note  that  while  the  above  reflections  concerning  the  nature  and  status  of  the  first
principles may have implications for how best to interpret Reid’s specific epistemological views
(i.e., whether he is a reliabilist, a proper functionalist, an evidentialist, or what have you), they
do not themselves determine the latter. (Compare Alston 1989: 24ff.)
21. Common sense, then, is implicated as well in the phenomena discussed in the previous § –
i.e., in the sceptic’s (alleged) inability to maintain consistency amongst his beliefs, and in the
distinction between real and merely apparent or professed doubt. 
22. Wolterstorff,  e.g.,  speaks  of  “the  striking  similarities  between  Reid’s  and  Wittgenstein’s
discussion of what we all do and must take for granted” (Wolterstorff 2001: 241). Others who
have noted the kinship include Alston 1989, 1993; Plant 2003; Nyíri 2015; Todd 1989; and Ferreira
1986.
23. The  allusion  here  is  to  Descartes’  well-known  analogical  defense  of  the  method  doubt:
“Suppose [a person] had a basket full of apples and, being worried that some of the apples were
rotten, wanted to take out the rotten ones to prevent the rot spreading. How would he proceed?
Would he not begin by tipping the whole lot out of the basket? And would not the next step be to
cast his eye over each apple in turn, and pick up and put back in the basket only those he saw to
be sound, leaving the others?” (Replies 7, AT 7: 481; 1988: 123).
24. Van  Cleve  (2015:  Chapters  11-3)  and  Coliva  2016  are  good  entry  points  to  the  relevant
literatures concerning Reid and Wittgenstein, respectively.
25. On Wittgenstein and pragmatism, in addition to other works cited herein, see e.g. those listed
in Haack (1982: 171, n. 8), and the papers appearing in Vol. 4, No. 2 (2012) of this journal. 
26. Cavell 1998 objects to Putnam’s 1995 so reading Wittgenstein. For a response, see Hensley
(2012: 30-1).
27. One example: “The philosopher is the man who has to cure himself of many sicknesses of the
understanding before he can arrive at the notions of the sound human understanding [gesunden
Menschenverstandes].” (Wittgenstein 1967: IV, §53). Another (reported) occurrence is this: “During
this lecture Wittgenstein referred to his slogan. ‘Don’t treat your commonsense like an umbrella.
When you come into a room to philosophize, don’t leave it outside but bring it in with you.’”
(Wittgenstein 1976: 68).
28. Moyal-Sharrock (2004: 101-4), e.g., recommends a four-fold taxonomy of ‘hinges,’ as linguistic,
personal, local and universal. It’s worth noting here that while Reid’s list of first principles are most
naturally read as quite general, he sometimes refers, as first principles, both to their specific
instances or applications (e.g., “The truths immediately testified by the external senses are the
first principles from which we reason, with regard to the material world, and from which all our
knowledge  of  it  is  deduced”  [1788:  3.3.6,  p.  176]),  and  to  more  specific  (but  still  general)
principles (e.g., “In games of chance, it is a first principle that every side of a die has an equal
chance to be turned up; and that, in a lottery, every ticket has an equal chance of being drawn
out” [1785: 6.4, p. 456]), which themselves are arguably grounded upon the more general first
principles Reid lists.
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29. According to Pritchard, the most general such hinge – “the über hinge” – is “that one is not
radically  and fundamentally  mistaken in one’s  beliefs” (2016:  95).  This  corresponds to Reid’s
seventh first principle of contingent truths mentioned above – viz., that the natural faculties, by
which we distinguish  truth from error,  are  not  fallacious (1785:  6.5,  p.  480)  –  which Reid himself
accords a special status (on which, see Rysiew 2011b). Compare here too Moyal-Sharrock’s view
of ‘universal hinges’ as “delimit[ing] the universal bounds of sense for us: they are ungiveupable
certainties for all normal human beings” (Moyal-Sharrock 2004: 103), and Wolterstorff’s (2000,
2001) discussion of ‘maximally ingressed’ beliefs as indubitable (though not infallible), with some
being “deeply ingressed in the belief systems of all (normal adult) human beings” (2000: 510). A
further issue is whether Wittgenstein holds, with Reid, that it is “the constitution of our nature”
which leads us to hold the relevant beliefs (e.g., 1764: 2.6, p. 33). Wolterstorff thinks not; he sees
Wittgenstein as someone “who tries as long as possible to make do without appealing to a shared
human nature” (Wolterstorff 2000: 512). In response, Plant (2003) has argued that on this matter
too Reid and Wittgenstein are, in fact, much closer than is often supposed. 
ABSTRACTS
This paper considers the views of two figures whose work falls on either side of the heyday of
American pragmatism, Thomas Reid (1710-96) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). The broad
similarities  between  Reid’s  and  (the  later)  Wittgenstein’s  views,  and  in  particular  their
epistemological views, has been well documented. Here, I argue that such similarities extend to
the relation in their work between common sense and the presence of elements in their thought
that can be considered pragmatist in some important respect. 
Beginning with Reid, I argue that some specific theses commonly associated with pragmatism –
e.g., that meaning, truth, or the justifiedness of a belief in a matter of practical effects or efficacy
– clearly run counter to his stated views, and stand in tension with the well-known common
sense  character  of  his  work.  At  the  same  time,  however,  and  as  others  have  noted,  other
pragmatist themes and ideas – e.g.,  about the close relations between belief (and doubt) and
action, theory and practice, and facts and values – do have a clear precedent in Reid (§2). Most
fundamentally, however, Reid’s epistemological views in particular display an adherence to the
idea that practice is somehow primary – an idea that’s central to pragmatism ‘broadly conceived’,
as Brandom calls it and, according to some others (e.g., Putnam, Cavell), to pragmatism per se.
What’s  more,  once  we  are  clear  on  the  respect(s)  in  which  Reid’s  views  do  incorporate  an
important pragmatist element, it becomes clear that far from being at odds with, or needing
supplementation by, the latter, common sense is in fact inseparable from it (§3). 
Finally,  I  turn  (§4)  to  Wittgenstein,  and  suggest  that  the  same  close  connection  between
pragmatist elements and common sense as we find in Reid is present here as well:  like Reid,
Wittgenstein rejects several ‘narrow’ pragmatist theses; but he too ascribes practice a crucial
role. And while he seldom explicitly refers to common sense, the notions of good judgment, and
of the reasonable person – hallmarks of common sense, as Reid conceives of it – are at the heart
of Wittgenstein’s later epistemological views as well. 
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